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a b s t r a c t
Facilities for handling plan execution failures are essential for agents which must cope
with the effects of nondeterministic actions, and some form of failure handling can be
found in most mature agent programming languages and platforms. While such features
simplify the development of more robust agents, they make it hard to reason about the
execution of agent programs, e.g., to verify their correctness. In this paper, we present an
approach to the verification of agent programs which admit exceptional executions. We
consider executions of the BDI-based agent programming language 3APL in which plans
containing non-executable actions can be revised using plan revision rules, and present a
logic for reasoning about normal and exceptional executions of 3APL programs.We provide
a complete axiomatization for the logic and, using a simple example, show how to express
properties of 3APL programs as formulas of the logic.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
3APL [1,2] is a BDI-based agent-oriented programming language designed to facilitate the implementation of cognitive
agents. In addition to programming constructs such as beliefs, goals, and plans common to many BDI-based agent
programming languages, 3APL provides support for plan revision rules which allow the agent’s plans to be revised at run
time. Plan revision rules are intended to deal with an important problem in agent programming, namely the need to cope
with the effects of nondeterministic action execution. For example, if an actionwhich is intended to establish a precondition
of a subsequent action in the same plan fails to do so, the agent needs to detect this and initiate some recovery behavior.
Some form of ‘failure handling’ facility can be found in most mature BDI-based agent languages and platforms. For
example, 2APL [3,4] provides plan revision rules which can be applied to revise plans whose executions have failed, Jason
[5,6] provides ‘‘clean up’’ plans triggered by the abandonment of a goal, JACK [7] and SPARK [8] provide failure methods
and/or meta-procedures which are triggered when plan execution fails, and in [9,10] features are proposed for aborting and
suspending tasks in the context of the CAN abstract agent programming language. However, while such features simplify
the development of more robust agents, they make it hard to reason about the execution of agent programs, e.g., to verify
their correctness. As a result, formal accounts of program execution in the literature have typically been limited to the
specification of the operational semantics of a particular failure handling construct as in [9] or to simplified versions of
the language which do not admit exceptional executions. For example, [11] considers SimpleAPL, a version of 3APL without
nondeterministic actions, plan revision rules, or anymechanism for dropping planswhose actions are unexecutable orwhen
the goal which led to the adoption of the plan has been achieved, and [12] considers alternative execution strategies but
again in the context of a simplified language and setting. Extending these accounts tomodel plan revisionpresents significant
challenges. In addition to the reasoning about the agent’s beliefs, goals and plans, we need tomodel the current state of plan
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execution, and the evolution of the agent’s program at run time in response to interactions between the actual (as opposed
to intended) effects of the agent’s actions in its environment and its plan revision rules.
In this paper we present an approach to reasoning about 3APL programs which include plan revision rules. We consider
external actions with nondeterministic outcomes which may lead to unexpected achievement of a goal, or an inability to
execute subsequent actions in the plan.We showhow such exceptional executions can be formalized in a logic incorporating
modalities to represent the agent’s beliefs, goals and plans, and how this logic can be used to state and verify properties of
the agent program. Themain technical contribution of this work is in extending Propositional Dynamic Logic (PDL) [13] with
explicit operators for ‘having a plan’ and axiomatizing the interaction of belief, goal and plan modalities and standard PDL
program modalities.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we define the syntax of 3APL and give its
operational semantics under both ‘intended’ and ‘exceptional’ executions. We then introduce the syntax and semantics of
a logic to reason about safety and liveness properties of 3APL programs. We provide a sound and complete axiomatization
of the logic, and prove a correspondence between the operational semantics of 3APL and the models of the logic. Finally,
we show how to translate agent programs written in 3APL into expressions of the logic, and, using a simple example, show
how to verify a safety property for an agent program which allows plan revision.
2. 3APL
In this section we summarize the syntax and semantics of 3APL. 3APL is a BDI-based agent-oriented programming
language which allows the implementation of agents with beliefs, (declarative) goals,1 actions, plans, and rules for adopting
and revising plans. We consider 3APL as defined in [2] with some minor modifications to simplify the presentation. The
main change is that we assume a propositional language for beliefs and goals in this paper whereas [2] uses a first order
language for beliefs and goals. However, 3APL assumes finite domains, and under this assumption all first order formulas can
be encoded as propositional formulas. Other differences from [2] include restricting beliefs to atoms and goals to literals, and
the omission of the send communication action.We also adopt amore precise formalization of external actionswhich allows
us to express when an external action can be executed and its possible effects. Finally, we follow the 2APL [4,3] approach
to plan revision rules in only applying plan revision rules to non-executable plans. These differences are discussed in more
detail in the relevant sections below. We illustrate our presentation of 3APL with a simple running example loosely based
on the example in [9]. In the example, an agent has a goal to attend a conference. To achieve this goal, it can adopt a plan of
writing and submitting a paper (which may or may not be accepted). However before it can submit the paper it must obtain
clearance from its organization. If the clearance is not given, the agent can revise the paper and apply for clearance again.
Writing a paper, applying for clearance and revising a paper take indeterminate amounts of time, with the result that they
may not complete before the deadline for paper submission is past.
In 3APL, an agent’s state is specified in terms of its beliefs, goals and plans, and its program by its initial state and its rules
for adopting and revising plans. The agent’s beliefs represent information about its environment while its goals represent
situations the agent wants to bring about. Note that although the agent’s beliefs are assumed to be consistent with each
other, an agent’s goals may conflict with each other as they do not all have to be achieved at the same time, i.e., goals that
are inconsistent are assumed to be achieved in sequence. For example, an agent may want to attend a conference, and to
write a proposal and not attend a conference. Although these two goals are conflicting in the sense that they cannot be
achieved at the same time, the agent can achieve one after the other. For simplicity, we restrict the agent’s beliefs to be a set
of atoms2 and assume the closed-world assumption, i.e., an agent believes – p if p is not in its beliefs. The agent’s goals are
a set of (possibly inconsistent) literals. For example, an agent might have a goal to attend a conference and believe that fly
is an option to travel:
BeliefBase: fly
GoalBase: attendConference
To achieve its goals, an agent adopts and executes plans. A plan consists of basic actions and abstract plans composed
by sequence, conditional choice and conditional iteration operators. The sequence operator, ‘;’, takes two plans, π1, π2, as
arguments and states that π1 should be performed before π2. The conditional choice and conditional iteration operators
allow branching and looping and generate plans of the form ‘if φ then π1 else π2’ and ‘while φ do π ’ respectively. The
condition φ is evaluated with respect to the agent’s current beliefs. For example, the plan:
writePaper; requestClearance; submitPaper;
if accepted then travelToConference
causes the agent to write and submit a paper, and, if the paper is accepted, to travel to the conference.
1 In the BDI literature, the terms ‘goal’ and ‘desire’ are often used interchangeably to denote the motivational attitude of an agent.
2 In [2] an agent’s beliefs can also include (definite) Horn clauses that can be used to infer new literals from existing atoms. This complicates the
axiomatization of belief update actions, since there may be several different ways of restoring consistency following a belief update. As belief update
is not the main focus of this paper, we consider only belief atoms here.
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Basic actions define the capabilities an agent can use to achieve its goals. There are two types of basic actions: belief test
actions and belief update actions. We first explain the intuitive idea of basic actions before giving their formal definitions.
A belief test action, denoted by φ?, tests whether the formula φ is derivable from an agent’s beliefs. If φ is derivable from
the agent’s beliefs, execution of the plan continues. If φ is not derivable from the agent’s beliefs, the belief test action is
not executable and execution of the plan containing the belief test action blocks. Belief test actions play a role somewhat
analogous to ‘assert’ statements in imperative programming languages. For example, they can be used to test if the execution
of an external action had the effect intended by the programmer (see below) and if not, block further execution of the plan.
Belief update actions are the primitive operations an agent can use to change its environment. In contrast to the version
of 3APL described in [2], we extend the notion of a belief update action to include both changing the agent’s environment
and updating the agent’s beliefs to reflect the effects of the action. In [2] a distinction is made between (deterministic)
mental actions which affect only the agent’s beliefs and (nondeterministic) actions which affect the external environment
and which are implemented as Java methods. For simplicity, we consider these two types of action together here, and use
the term belief update action for both. We extend the notion of a ‘capability’, used in [2] to define mental actions, to allow
the specification of nondeterministic external actions. The effects of a belief update action are defined in terms of pre- and
postconditions. Each action has a set of preconditions specifying the situations in which the action is executable, and, for
each precondition there is a set of postconditions, one for each possible outcome of executing the action in an environment
in which the precondition holds (pre- and postconditions are sets of literals).3 One or more postconditions correspond to
the effect(s) of the action intended by the programmer, while the others correspond to possible but unintended outcomes
(in the sense that they fail to achieve the agent’s goal or make it impossible to execute subsequent actions in the plan).
An action is executable if the belief literals in one of its preconditions are in the agent’s current beliefs. When the action is
executed, one of the postconditions associated with the precondition is chosen to modify the agent’s beliefs. Execution of
external actions is therefore nondeterministic, with the effects of the action being ‘chosen’ by the agent’s environment. If
the postcondition chosen by the environment corresponds to an unintended outcome, we say the action fails. Executing an
action may take time, and agent execution resumes when the action terminates. For example, the belief update action
{paper, clearance, -deadlinePast}
submitPaper
{{accepted}, {rejected}}
can be read as ‘‘if the agent has a paper and has obtained clearance, and the submission deadline has not passed, then
the paper can be submitted, which results in one of two possible outcomes—in the first the paper is accepted (the intended
outcome) and in the second it is rejected (an unintended outcome)’’. If none of the preconditions of an action is in the agent’s
current beliefs, the action is not executable and execution of the plan containing the action blocks. For example, if the agent
does not have clearance, the submitPaper action is not executable. If execution of a plan blocks because the first step in the
plan is a non-executable basic (belief test or belief update) action, we say plan execution fails (see [4,3] for more detailed
discussion of plan execution failure).
Our model of belief update actions effectively combines the execution of an external action with sensing to determine
the effect of the action. For simplicity, we assume that belief update actions always terminate in one of the possible
postconditions of the action, and that the agent’s beliefs about the resulting state of environment are always correct.
Execution of belief update actions maintains consistency of the agent’s beliefs, i.e., if p is in an agent’s belief base before
executing an action α and the postcondition of α chosen by the environment contains – p, p is removed from the agent’s
belief base. Goals which are achieved by the postcondition of an action are dropped.4 If a goal for which a plan was selected
is achieved while the plan is still being executed, the plan is also dropped.
Unlike basic actions, abstract plans cannot be directly executed by the agent. Abstract plans provide an abstraction
mechanism (similar to procedures in imperative programming) which are expanded into basic actions using plan revision
rules (see below). If the first step of a plan π is an abstract plan α¯, execution of π blocks.
To adopt or revise plans, the agent uses rules. To adopt appropriate plans, the agent uses planning goal rules. A planning
goal rule is of the form γ ← β | π and consists of three parts: an (optional) goal query γ specifying the goal the plan is
intended to achieve, a belief query β characterizing situation(s) in which it could be a good idea to adopt the plan, and π
the plan to be adopted. A planning goal rule is applicable if the goal and belief queries which form the head of the rule are
derivable from the agent’s goal and belief bases respectively, and the agent does not currently have a plan for this goal in
its plan base. Applying a planning goal rule causes the agent to adopt the specified plan. The agent is committed to goals for
which it has adopted a plan, and these goals correspond to what are termed ‘intentions’ in the BDI literature. For example,
the planning goal rule:
attendConference <- -paper and -deadlinePast |
writePaper; requestClearance; submitPaper;
if accepted then travelToConference
3 The deterministic mental actions of [2] therefore correspond to belief update actions with a single postcondition in our formulation.
4 In [2] dropping plans is part of the agent’s deliberation strategy; for simplicity, we incorporate it into the basic language.
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states that ‘‘if the agent’s goal is to attend the conference, and the agent believes it has no paper and the submission deadline
is not past, then it may adopt the specified plan’’. Note that the goal query part of a planning goal rule is optional so that an
agent can generate a plan based only on its current beliefs. This allows the implementation of reactive agents (agents whose
behavior is partly or wholly triggered by their beliefs).
Other agent programming languages, such as AgentSpeak(L) [14] and Jason [5,6], utilize a similar approach to adopting
plans. However there are important differences between such languages and 3APL. A planning goal rule in 3APL is applicable
if the goal query in the head of the rule is derivable from the agent’s goal base (and the belief query evaluates to true). In
contrast, in AgentSpeak(L) and Jason, a plan is applicable when a belief or goal change event matches the triggering event
of the plan. This means that in 3APL a planning goal rule can be reapplied as long as the corresponding goal has not been
achieved (i.e., as long as its corresponding goal is not derivable from the agent’s belief base),while in Jason andAgentSpeak(L)
a plan is adopted at most once in response to a triggering event.
Note that adopting a plan by applying a planning goal rule does not guarantee that the plan can be successfully executed.
The belief query that characterizes the situation(s) in which it could be a good idea to adopt the plan is only a heuristic, and
in general cannot capture the preconditions of all the actions in the plan. Inmany cases, whether an action α in a plan can be
successfully executed depends critically on one or more preceding actions in the plan having their intended effects in order
to establish the appropriate precondition for α. However, as belief update actions are nondeterministic, executing an action
may not have the intended effect of establishing a precondition of an action later in the plan.We say a plan is not executable if
the first step in the plan is either a belief test actionwhich evaluates to false or a belief update actionwhich is not executable
(i.e., none of its preconditions are derivable from the agent’s current beliefs) or an abstract plan. (Non-executable plans are
called blocked in [15].)
Plan revision rules can be used by the agent to revise non-executable plans. A plan revision rule is of the form π ← β | π ′
and consists of three parts: a plan to be revised π , a belief query β characterizing the situation(s) in which it may be a
good idea to adopt this revision, and a new plan π ′. Plan revision rules are applicable when the plan to be revised is in the
agent’s plan base, the belief query is derivable from the agent’s belief base and the next step in the plan is not executable.
Applying a plan revision rule causes the agent to replace π in its plan base with π ′. For example, assume that while the
requestClearance action may result in the agent obtaining clearance, on some occasions it does not.
{paper, -clearance, -deadlinePast}
requestClearance
{{clearance}, { }}
If the agent does not obtain clearance, the agent is unable to execute the next step in its plan (since obtaining clearance is a
precondition of submitting a paper). To handle such situations, the agent can utilize a plan revision rule such as:
submitPaper; π <- paper and -clearance and -deadlinePast |
revisePaper; requestClearance; submitPaper; π
where π = if accepted then travelToConference.
The revised plan resulting from the application of a plan revision rulemay simply replace the non-executable actionwith
a new action or sequence of actions followed by the rest of the original plan, or it may replace the original plan in its entirety.
In particular, a plan may be replaced by the empty plan, allowing the agent to abandon a failed plan and use its planning
goal rules to select a new plan to achieve the goal which is more appropriate to the current belief context. For example, if
writing the paper takes until after the submission deadline is past, the agent can utilize a plan revision rule such as:
requestClearance; π <- deadlinePast | ϵ
where π = submitPaper; if accepted then travelToConference and ϵ is the null plan, to drop the plan. Note that
the agent still has the goal of attending the conference, and, if it has other applicable planning goal rules, it can adopt an
alternative plan to attend the conference.
Plan revision rules give a 3APL developer considerable flexibility in determining how plan execution failures are handled.
For example, if a particular action α is likely to fail but can be safely retried in the resulting environment, the developer
can simply test for the intended postcondition φ and, if it does not hold, repeat the action: while –φ do α. However
if recovering from the failure of α depends on which of the unintended outcomes of α actually results, we can include
a belief test action after α which tests if φ has been achieved, e.g., α1 ;φ? ;α2, and rely on the belief queries in the
corresponding plan revision rules to select the appropriate recovery action(s). Alternatively, if an action α1 is unlikely to fail
and establishes the precondition of a subsequent action αk, and recovering from the failure is easy even if the intervening
actions α2 ; . . . ;αk−1 have been executed, then the developer can simply rely on the non-executable action αk triggering
plan revision. Similar tradeoffs between how many and which kinds of failures to anticipate are also found in conditional
planning and conventional imperative programming.
In addition to recovering from plan execution failures, in 3APL plan revision rules are also used to implement abstract
plans. An abstract plan α¯ is expanded to a (more concrete) plan π ′ using a plan revision rule of the form α¯;π ← β | π ′;π .
The use of plan revision rules allows the selection of subplans to be context sensitive, i.e., conditional on the agent’s beliefs.
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For example, if travelToConference is an abstract action, and the agent believes it should fly to the conference, it can use
a plan revision rule such as:
travelToConference <- fly |
buyPlaneTicket; flyToConference
to expand the abstract action.
We say the execution of a 3APL program is successful if it achieves the agent’s goals. Conversely, we say that execution
of a 3APL program fails if the agent is not able to achieve its goals, either because it has no planning goal rule to adopt an
appropriate plan for a goal in the current belief context, or an adopted plan is not executable in the current belief context
and the agent has no appropriate plan revision rule to repair it.
2.1. 3APL syntax
The syntax of 3APL programs is given below in EBNF notation. It is defined relative to a set of propositions (atoms),
belief update actions, and abstract plans. Following EBNF notation, we use [] brackets to indicate optional elements of the
language.
Definition 1 (3APL Program). Let ⟨uaction⟩ denote the name of a belief update action, ⟨absplan⟩ denote the name of an
abstract plan, ⟨literal⟩ denote a (belief or goal) literal, and ⟨atom⟩ denote a proposition. Then the syntax of 3APL is defined
as follows:
⟨3APL_Prog⟩ ::= "BeliefUpdates:" ⟨updatespecs⟩
| "BeliefBase:" ⟨beliefs⟩
| "GoalBase:" ⟨goals⟩
| "PG-rules:" ⟨pgrules⟩
| "PR-rules:" ⟨prrules⟩
⟨updatespecs⟩ ::= [⟨updatespec⟩ ("," ⟨updatespec⟩)* ]
⟨updatespec⟩ ::= ⟨preconditions⟩ ⟨uaction⟩ ⟨postconditions⟩
⟨beliefs⟩ ::= [⟨atom⟩ ("," ⟨atom⟩)*]
⟨goals⟩ ::= [⟨literals⟩]
⟨plan⟩ ::= ⟨baction⟩ | ⟨absplan⟩ | ⟨sequenceplan⟩ | ⟨ifplan⟩ | ⟨whileplan⟩
⟨baction⟩ ::= ⟨uaction⟩ | ⟨testbelief ⟩
⟨testbelief ⟩ ::= ⟨query⟩ "?"
⟨sequenceplan⟩ ::= ⟨plan⟩ ";" ⟨plan⟩
⟨ifplan⟩ ::= "if" ⟨query⟩ "then {" ⟨plan⟩ "}" ["else {" ⟨plan⟩ "}"]
⟨whileplan⟩ ::= "while" ⟨query⟩ "do {" ⟨plan⟩ "}"
⟨pgrules⟩ ::= [⟨pgrule⟩ ("," ⟨pgrule⟩)* ]
⟨pgrule⟩ ::= [⟨literal⟩] "<-" ⟨query⟩ "|" ⟨plan⟩
⟨prrules⟩ ::= [⟨prrule⟩ ("," ⟨prrule⟩)* ]
⟨prrule⟩ ::= ⟨plan⟩ "<-" ⟨query⟩ "|" ⟨plan⟩
⟨query⟩ ::= ⟨literal⟩ | ⟨query⟩ "and" ⟨query⟩ | ⟨query⟩ "or" ⟨query⟩
⟨preconditions⟩ ::= ⟨condition⟩ [("," ⟨condition⟩)*]
⟨postconditions⟩::= ⟨conditions⟩ [("," ⟨conditions⟩)*]
⟨conditions⟩ ::= "{" ⟨condition⟩ [("," ⟨condition⟩)*] "}"
⟨condition⟩ ::= "{" ⟨literals⟩ "}"
⟨literals⟩ ::= [⟨literal⟩ ("," ⟨literal⟩)*]
2.2. Operational semantics
In this section, we present a slightly modified version of the operational semantics for 3APL given in [2], focusing on
individual agents. We define the formal semantics of 3APL in terms of a transition system [16]. Each transition corresponds
to a single execution step and takes the system from one configuration to another.
Definition 2 (3APL Configuration). The configuration of an agent is defined as ⟨σ , γ ,Π⟩ where σ is a set of atoms
representing the agent’s beliefs, γ is a set of literals representing the agent’s goals, andΠ is a set of plans.
An agent’s initial beliefs and goals are specified by its programandΠ is initially empty.We assume that the agent adopts a
non-interleaved execution strategy: ‘‘when in a configurationwith no plan, choose a planning goal rule nondeterministically,
apply it, execute the resulting plan to completion; repeat’’. If there are no applicable planning goal rules, the agent halts.
Plan revision rules are only applied when the next step in the agent’s plan cannot be executed: i.e., ‘‘when in a configuration
with a non-executable plan, choose a plan revision rule nondeterministically, apply it, and execute the revised plan’’. If there
are no applicable plan revision rules for a non-executable plan, the agent halts. With a non-interleaved execution strategy,
at any point in the agent’s execution,Π is either empty or contains a single plan. We annotate the plan base with the goal
query, κ , of the planning goal rule that resulted in the adoption of the current plan π , denoted {π ◃ κ}.
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In formalizing the operational semantics, we use a notion of belief entailment based on the closed-world assumption and
a notion of goal entailment based on set inclusion. The belief entailment relation is used to determine whether a formula is
entailed by a belief base (which is a set of atoms) and the goal entailment relation is used to determined whether a formula
is entailed by a goal base (which is a set of literals).
Definition 3 (Belief and Goal Entailment). Let σ be a belief base, γ be a goal base, p be an atom, l be a literal, and φ, φi, ψ be
queries (see Definition 1). Then the belief and goal entailment relations, denoted respectively by σ |=cwa φ and γ |=g l, are
defined as follows:
σ |=cwa p ⇔ p ∈ σ
σ |=cwa −p ⇔ p ∉ σ
σ |=cwa φ and ψ ⇔ σ |=cwa φ and σ |=cwa ψ
σ |=cwa φ or ψ ⇔ σ |=cwa φ or σ |=cwa ψ
σ |=cwa {φ1, . . . , φn} ⇔ ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n σ |=cwa φi
γ |=g l ⇔ l ∈ γ
Executing an agent’s program modifies its initial configuration ⟨σ , γ ,Π⟩ in accordance with the following transition
rules.
Basic Actions Each belief update action α has a set of preconditions prec1(α), . . . , preck(α). Each preci(α) is a finite set of
belief literals, and any two preconditions for an action α, preci(α) and precj(α) (i ≠ j), are mutually exclusive (both sets
of propositional variables cannot be satisfied simultaneously). For each precondition preci(α) there is a set of matching
postconditions posti,1(α), . . . , posti,k(α), one for each possible outcome of an action. Each postcondition is also a finite
set of literals. A belief update action α can be executed if σ |=cwa preci(α). Executing α adds the positive literals in one of
the postconditions posti,1(α), . . . , posti,k(α) corresponding to preci(α) to the agent’s beliefs and removes any existing
atoms from the agent’s beliefs if their negations are in the postcondition.
Definition 4 (Belief Update). Let α be a belief update action, preci be a precondition of α, posti,j be one of the
corresponding postconditions of preci, and σ be a belief base such that σ |=cwa preci. Then the outcome Ti,j(α, σ ) of
updating σ with α is defined as follows:
Ti,j(α, σ ) = (σ ∪ {p : p ∈ posti,j(α)}) \ {p : – p ∈ posti,j(α)}.
Observe that Ti,j(α, σ ) |=cwa posti,j(α) for all belief bases σ .
The successful execution of a belief update action α in a configuration whereΠ = {α;π ◃ κ} (where π may be null) is
then:
σ |=cwa preci(α) Ti,j(α, σ ) = σ ′ γ ′ = γ \ {φ ∈ γ | σ ′ |=cwa φ} σ ′ |̸=cwa κ
⟨σ , γ , {α;π ◃ κ}⟩ −→ ⟨σ ′, γ ′, {π ◃ κ}⟩ . (1a)
Note that executing a belief update action causes the agent to drop any goals it believes to be achieved as a result of the
update. If the goal condition for the current plan, κ , is dropped, the plan is also dropped:
σ |=cwa preci(α) Ti,j(α, σ ) = σ ′ γ ′ = γ \ {φ ∈ γ | σ ′ |=cwa φ} σ ′ |=cwa κ
⟨σ , γ , {α;π ◃ κ}⟩ −→ ⟨σ ′, γ ′, { }⟩ . (1b)
A belief test action β? can be executed if β is entailed by the agent’s beliefs.
σ |=cwa β
⟨σ , γ , {β?;π ◃ κ}⟩ −→ ⟨σ , γ , {π ◃ κ}⟩ . (2)
If a belief update action α is not executable or a belief test action β is not derivable from the agents beliefs, execution of
the plan containing the belief update or test action blocks, and the plan must be revised by applying a plan revision rule as
explained below.
Conditional plans The following transition rules specify the effect of executing the conditional choice and conditional
iteration operators, respectively. Note that the sequence operator, ‘;’, is specified implicitly by the other rules which specify
how to execute the first operation in the sequence.
σ |=cwa φ
⟨σ , γ , {if φ then π1 else π2;π ◃ κ}⟩ −→ ⟨σ , γ , {π1;π ◃ κ}⟩ (3a)
σ |̸=cwa φ
⟨σ , γ , {if φ then π1 else π2;π ◃ κ}⟩ −→ ⟨σ , γ , {π2;π ◃ κ}⟩ (3b)
σ |=cwa φ
⟨σ , γ , {while φ do π1;π ◃ κ}⟩ −→ ⟨σ , γ , {π1; while φ do π1;π ◃ κ}⟩ (4a)
σ |̸=cwa φ
⟨σ , γ , {while φ do π1;π ◃ κ}⟩ −→ ⟨σ , γ , {π ◃ κ}⟩ . (4b)
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Rules A planning goal rule ri = κi ← βi |πi can be applied if κi is entailed by the agent’s goals, βi is entailed by the agent’s
beliefs, and the agent’s plan base is empty. Applying the rule ri adds πi to the agent’s plans.
γ |=g κi σ |=cwa βi
⟨σ , γ , {}⟩ −→ ⟨σ , γ , {πi ◃ κi}⟩ . (5)
A plan revision rule pj = πj ← βj |π ′j can be applied if πj is in the plan base, βj is entailed by the agent’s beliefs and πj is
not executable, i.e., the first action of πj is either a belief update or belief test action which is not executable in the current
belief state, or an abstract plan. (Note that this means that in order for a plan revision rule to be applicable, the plan base
must be non-empty.)
∀i σ |̸=cwa preci(α) σ |=cwa βj
⟨σ , γ , {πj = α;π ◃ κ}⟩ −→ ⟨σ , γ , {π ′j ◃ κ}⟩ (6a)
σ |̸=cwa β σ |=cwa βj
⟨σ , γ , {πj = β?;π ◃ κ}⟩ −→ ⟨σ , γ , {π ′j ◃ κ}⟩ (6b)
σ |=cwa βj
⟨σ , γ , {πj = α¯;π ◃ κ}⟩ −→ ⟨σ , γ , {π ′j;π ◃ κ}⟩ (6c)
where α¯ is the name of an abstract plan.
Definition 5 (Transition Rules for the Operational Semantics of 3APL). The only transitions allowed by the operational
semantics of 3APL are rules (1a)–(6c) listed above.
3. Logic
In this section, we show how to describe state transition systems corresponding to the operational semantics of 3APL in
an extension of Propositional Dynamic Logic (PDL) [13] with belief, goal and plan operators, which we call PDL-3APL.
The models of the logic look quite similar to the transition systems generated by the operational semantics of the agent.
They consist of states, which intuitively correspond to configurations of the agent in operational semantics, and labeled
transitions between pairs of states. Each state has an assignment of beliefs, goals and of at most a single plan. Transitions
between states correspond to executing a basic action, applying a planning goal rule, etc., and this information is captured
in the label of the transition. For technical reasons, which will become clear after the precise statement of correspondence
between the operational semantics and the PDL-3APL models, some states are marked by a special symbol x. Intuitively,
those are the states where the goal corresponding to the agent’s current plan has been achieved or the current plan is not
executable.
The models of the logic are defined relative to an agent program. Therefore, we present the ingredients of an agent
program which are used in defining the models before presenting the PDL-3APL language. Note that the definition below
generalizes the definition of a 3APL program (Definition 1). Namely, we abstract from the initial belief and goal bases. We
also explicitly include the set of all possible plans which may occur in the execution of a program.
Definition 6 (Signature of an Agent Program). The signature of an agent program R is defined as
R = ⟨P , PG, PR,Ac, A¯c,Act, Plan⟩
where:
• P is a set of belief and goal atoms
• PG is a set of planning goal rules. We will denote elements of PG by ri, where ri = κi ← βi |πi• PR is a set of plan revision rules. We will denote elements of PR by pj, where pj = πj ← βj |π ′j• Ac is a set of belief update actions occurring in the plans of PG and PR rules
• A¯c is a set of abstract plans occurring in the plans of PG and PR rules
• Act is the set of specifications for belief update actions Ac. For each element α ∈ Ac, Act includes a set of
mutually exclusive preconditions prec1(α), . . . , precm(α) and for each precondition preci(α), a set of postconditions
posti1(α), . . . , postik(α)• Plan is the set of all possible π ◃ κ pairs where κ is one of the agent’s goals and π is a plan occurring in PG and PR rules
or a suffix of such a plan (see Definition 7). ϵ denotes the null plan.
The last clause in the above definition specifies the set of all plans that can occur during the execution of an agent program.
Since plans are inserted into a configuration by PG and PR rules, and the execution of plan steps removes expressions from
the beginning of the plans, the set of all possible plans that can occur during the agent’s execution is the set of all suffixes of
plans in the PG and PR rules. The following definition specifies a suffix of a plan.
Definition 7 (Plan Suffix). A suffix of a plan π , or otherwise a partial execution of π , is defined as follows:
• If π = π1;π2 then π2 is a suffix of π ;• If π = if φ′ then π1 else π2;π ′ then π1;π ′ and π2;π ′ are suffixes of π ;
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• If π = (while φ′ do π1);π ′ then π1; (while φ′ do π1);π ′ is a suffix of π ;
• A suffix of a suffix of π is a suffix of π .
Note that if the sets of PG and PR rules are finite, then the set Plan is finite too. This is due the fact that all plans in Plan are
either occur in a rule or are a suffix of such a plan and each plan has a finite number of suffixes.
3.1. Language
The language L of PDL-3APL is similar to that of PDL in that it contains modal operators corresponding to program
expressions, or labels of transitions in the state transition system.
Definition 8 (PDL-3APL). Let R = ⟨P , PG, PR, Ac, A¯c , Act, Plan⟩ be the signature of an agent program. Let φ be either a
formula of type ⟨query⟩ (see Definition 1) or its negation, δr i be the action of applying a planning goal rule ri from PG, δpj be
the action of applying a plan revision rule pj from PR, p ∈ P , π ∈ Plan, κ be κi in ri ∈ PG, and x be a boolean flag. Then a
program expression ρ of L is defined as follows:
ρ ::= α ∈ Ac | t(φ) | a¯ ∈ A¯c | δr i | δpj | ρ1; ρ2 | ρ1 ∪ ρ2 | ρ∗
and a formula ψ of PDL-3APL relative to R is defined as follows:
ψ ::= Bp | Gp | G – p | x | Pκπ | Pϵ |¬ψ | ψ1 ∧ ψ2 | ⟨ρ⟩ψ.
In the definition of program expressions, ρ1; ρ2 is a sequential composition of ρ1 and ρ2, ρ1∪ρ2 corresponds to executing
either ρ1 or ρ2, and ρ∗ corresponds to executing ρ zero or finitely many times. The reason we use t(φ) rather than the PDL
test operator φ? (for any PDL-3APL formula φ) is that unlike φ?, the execution of t(φ) changes the state. Namely, the agent’s
plan is part of the state, and evaluating a test changes the agent’s plan (for example, if in the current state the plan is
if φ then π1 else π2 and the test formula φ evaluates to true, then as the result of the test transition, the plan in the next
state is π1). In the translation of conditional choice and conditional iteration as PDL program expressions we need to use a
test action t(¬φ), hence the extension of the set of test formulas to¬⟨query⟩.
In the definition of PDL-3APL, Bp stands for the agent believes that p, Gl for the agent has the goal that l, x is a boolean flag
indicating a state where the current plan has to be dropped (the goal has been achieved) or revised (the plan is blocked),
Pκπ stands for the agent has a plan π for achieving goal κ , Pϵ stands for the plan base is empty, ρ is a program expression
denoting a transition, and ⟨ρ⟩ψ stands for ‘there exists a state reachable by a transition denoted by ρ which satisfies ψ ’.
The dual modality is defined as [ρ]ψ = ¬⟨ρ⟩¬ψ and means that all states reachable by a ρ transition satisfy ψ . We will
sometimes use an abbreviation ⟨[ρ]⟩ψ for ⟨ρ⟩ψ ∧ [ρ]ψ , and the usual ∨,→ definitions.
3.2. Models
Themodels of PDL-3APL are labeled state transition systems. To relate thesemodels to the operational semantics of 3APL,
a number of conditions will be imposed on the states and transitions. For the sake of presentation, the models are defined
with only references to the conditions. The conditions themselves will be specified directly after the definition of PDL-3APL
models.
Definition 9 (PDL-3APL Models). Let R = ⟨P , PG, PR, Ac, A¯c , Act, Plan⟩ be the signature of an agent program. A PDL-3APL
modelM relative to R is defined as
M = (W , V ,Rα,Rt(φ),Rα¯,Rδr i ,Rδpj)
where
• W is a non-empty set of states.
• V = (Vb, Vg , Vc, Vp) is an evaluation function consisting of belief and goal valuation functions Vb and Vg satisfying
condition C1 (see below), control valuation function Vc and plan valuation function Vp such that for every s ∈ W :
– Vb(s) = {p1, . . . , pm : pi ∈ P } is the set of the agent’s beliefs in s;
– Vg(s) = {( – )u1, . . . , ( – )un : ui ∈ P } is the set of the agent’s goals in s (note that Vg assigns literals rather than
propositional variables);
– Vc(s) is either an empty set or {x}; if x is in Vc(s) this means that either the goal corresponding to the agent’s plan has
been achieved or the agent’s plan is not executable in s;
– Vp(s) is either the empty set or a singleton set {π ◃ κ}, where π is the agent’s plan in s and κ is the goal(s) achieved
by this plan.
• Rα ,Rt(φ),Rα¯ ,Rδr i ,Rδpi are sets of binary relations onW defined as follows:
– Rα = {Rα : α ∈ Ac}, where Rα is a set of pairs of states connected by a transition corresponding to a belief update
action.Rα is the largest relation satisfying conditions C2, C4, and C8 below.
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– Rt(φ) = {Rt(φ) : φ ∈ ¬ ⟨query⟩ }, where Rt(φ) is a set of pairs of states connected by a transition corresponding to
testing whether φ is true.Rt(φ) is the largest relation satisfying conditions C3, C5, C7, and C8 below.
– Rα¯ = {Rα¯ : α ∈ A¯c}, where Rα¯ is a set of pairs of states connected by a transition corresponding to an abstract plan.
Rα¯ is the largest relation satisfying conditions C6 and C8 below.
– Rδr i = {Rδr i : ri ∈ PG}, where Rδr i is a set of pairs of states connected by a PG rule firing transition.Rδr i is the largest
relation satisfying condition C9 below.
– Rδpi = {Rδpj : pj ∈ PR}, where Rδpj is a set of pairs of states connected by a PR rule firing transition.Rδpi is the largest
relation satisfying condition C10 below.
The conditions C1–C10 enforce a correspondence between the operational semantics of 3APL and the models of PDL-
3APL. The first condition C1 restricts the states to thosewhere beliefs and goals are disjoint while C2–C10 restrict transitions
between states. Only transitions satisfying these conditions exist in a model. We define each condition below. Note that,
unless otherwise stated, Vy(s′) = Vy(s)where y is b, g , c or p, and the plan π in the conditions below may be null.
C1 (Beliefs and Goals). Beliefs and goals are disjoint:
1. Vg(s) ∩ Vb(s) = ∅ (p can never be both a belief and a goal)
2. {p : – p ∈ Vg(s)} ⊆ Vb(s) (if – p is a goal, then – p does not follow by the closed-world assumption from the agent’s
beliefs)
The intuition behind conditions C2–C10 on relations Rα , Rt(φ), Rα¯ , Rδr i and Rδpi is that in non-x states, transition relations
in M correspond to the transitions possible in the operational semantics: for example, Rα is possible if α is the first step in
the current plan and a precondition of α holds. When a goal is achieved, or when the next step in the plan is not executable,
there is instead a transition to a x-state which in turn may have a transition by a PG or PR rule to a non-x state again. So,
while all transitions in non-x states correspond to the transitions in the operational semantics, only some of the transitions
in x states have a corresponding transition in the operational semantics. We need x-states to ‘consume’ the rest of a PDL
program expression when its corresponding plan in a state s (denoted by Vp(s)) is being dropped, in the sense which will
become clear in the following section.
C2 (Execution of Belief Update Actions). If Vp(s) = {α;π ◃ κ}, Vb(s) |=cwa preci(α) and x ∉ Vc(s) then there is an Rα
transition to a state s′ where
1. Vb(s′) = Ti,j(α, Vb(s)) (Vb(s′) is the result of updating Vb(s)with some postcondition of α)
2. Vg(s′) = Vg(s) \ ({p : p ∈ Vb(s′)} ∪ { – p : p ∉ Vb(s′)}) (goals which have been achieved by executing α are dropped)
3. if Vb(s′) |̸=cwa κ , Vp(s′) = {π ◃ κ} (if the goal of the current plan has not been achieved, α is removed from the current
plan). This corresponds to rule (1a) of the operational semantics.
4. if Vb(s′) |=cwa κ , x ∈ Vc(s′) and Vp(s′) = {} (if the goal of the current plan has been achieved, the plan is dropped and we
transit to an x state). This corresponds to rule (1b) of the operational semantics.
C3 (Execution of Tests). If Vp(s) = {φ?;π ◃κ}, Vb(s) |=cwa φ, and x ∉ Vc(s), then there is a Rt(φ) transition to a state s′ where
Vp(s′) = {π ◃ κ}. This corresponds to rule (2) of the operational semantics.
C4 (Non-executable Belief Update Actions). If Vp(s) = {α;π ◃ κ}, Vb(s) |̸=cwa preci(α), and x ∉ Vc(s), then there is an Rα
transition to a state s′ where x ∈ Vc(s′). This corresponds to the ‘first half’ of the operational semantics rule (6a); the ‘second
half’, which transits back to a non-x state, corresponds to condition C10 below.
C5 (Non-executable Tests). If Vp(s) = {φ?;π ◃ κ}, Vb(s) |̸=cwa φ, and x ∉ Vc(s), then there is a Rt(φ) transition to a state s′
where x ∈ Vc(s′). This corresponds to the ‘first half’ of the operational semantics rule (6b); the ‘second half’, which transits
back to a non-x state, corresponds to condition C10 below.
C6 (Expansion of Abstract Plans). If Vp(s) = {α¯;π◃κ}where α¯ is an abstract plan and x ∉ Vc(s), then there is an Rα¯ transition
to a state s′where x ∈ Vc(s′). This corresponds to the ‘first half’ of the operational semantics rule (6c); the ‘second half’, which
transits back to a non-x state, corresponds to condition C10 below.
C7 (Execution of Conditional Plans). 1. If Vp(s)= {if φ then π1 else π2;π ◃κ}, Vb(s) |=cwa φ, and x ∉ Vc(s), then there is
an Rt(φ) transition to a state s′ where Vp(s′) = {π1;π ◃ κ}. This corresponds to rule (3a) of the operational semantics.
2. If Vp(s) = {if φ then π1 else π2; π ◃ κ}, Vb(s) |̸=cwa φ, and x ∉ Vc(s), then there is a Rt(¬φ): transition to a state s′
where Vp(s′) = {π2;π ◃ κ}. This corresponds to rule (3b) of the operational semantics.
3. If Vp(s) = {while φ do π1; π ◃ κ}, Vb(s) |=cwa φ, and x ∉ Vc(s), then there is an Rt(φ) transition to a state s′ where
Vp(s′) = {π1; while φ do π1; π ◃ κ}. This corresponds to rule (4a) of the operational semantics.
4. If Vp(s) = {while φ do π1; π ◃ κ}, Vb(s) |̸=cwa φ, and x ∉ Vc(s), then there is an Rt(¬φ) transition to a state s′ where
Vp(s′) = {π ◃ κ}. This corresponds to rule (4b) of the operational semantics.
C8 (Execution in x-states). If x ∈ Vc(s) then there are Rα , Rα¯ and Rt(φ) transitions from state s to itself. This condition ensures
that there is a path from any x-state to itself, labeled by the remaining actions of the PDL program expression, so that the
remainder of the PDL program expression is ‘consumed’ without changing the state.
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C9 (PG Rules). If Vp(s) = {}, Vg(s) |=g κi, Vb(s) |=cwa βi, then there is a Rδr i transition to a state s′ where Vp(s′) = {πi ◃ κi}
and x ∉ Vc(s′) (where ri = κi ← βi |πi).
Note that PG rules are applicable only if the plan base is empty, and the states in which they are applicable may be x-
states. If a plan achieves its goal, even by the last action of the plan, this results in transiting to an x-state with an empty plan
base. Firing a PG rule results in transition to a non-x state, with the same beliefs and goals, and a new plan in the plan base.
This corresponds to the rule (5) of the operational semantics. As in the operational semantics, if no PG rule is applicable, the
program halts.
C10 (PR Rules). If x ∈ Vc(s), Vp(s) = {πj◃κ}, Vb(s) |=cwa βj, then there is a Rδpj transition to a state s′ where Vp(s′) = {π ′j ◃κ}
and x ∉ Vc(s′) (where pj = πj ← βj |π ′j ).
This means that PR rules are only applicable in x-states with a non-empty plan base which matches the condition of the
PR rule. Firing a PR rule results in transiting to a non-x state with a modified plan base. This corresponds to the ‘second
half’ of rules (6a)–(6c) of the operational semantics. As in the operational semantics, if current plan blocks and no PR rule is
applicable, the program halts.
The primitive transitions for belief update action, test action, abstract plan, and rule applications can be composed by
standard PDL operators, i.e., choice, sequence, and iteration operators.
Definition 10 (Transition Relation Composition). Given the basic relations Ru (where u is α, t(φ), α¯, δr i or δpj) defined in the
model, we can define relations Rρ corresponding to complex program expressions ρ inductively as follows:
• Rρ1∪ρ2 = Rρ1 ∪ Rρ2• Rρ1;ρ2 = Rρ1 ◦ Rρ2 where ◦ is composition of relations• Rρ∗ = (Rρ)∗ (reflexive transitive closure of Rρ)
The satisfaction relation for PDL-3APL is a slight modification of the standard definition of the satisfaction relation for
PDL.
Definition 11 (Satisfaction Relation |=). The relation |= of a PDL-3APL formulaφ being true in a state s of amodelM , denoted
asM, s |= φ, is defined inductively as follows:
• M, s |= Bp iff p ∈ Vb(s)
• M, s |= Gp iff p ∈ Vg(s)
• M, s |= G – p iff – p ∈ Vg(s)
• M, s |= x iff x ∈ Vc(s)
• M, s |= Pκπ iff Vp(s) = {π ◃ κ}
• M, s |= Pϵ iff Vp(s) = {}
• M, s |= ¬ψ iffM, s |̸= ψ
• M, s |= ψ1 ∧ ψ2 iffM, s |= ψ1 andM, s |= ψ2
• M, s |= ⟨ρ⟩ψ iff there exists s′ such that Rρ(s, s′) andM, s′ |= ψ .
We denote the class of models satisfying the conditions C1–C10 for an agent program with signature R asM3APL(R). We
say that a formula φ isM3APL(R)-valid (or valid, when there is no ambiguity) if for allM ∈ M3APL(R) and all s,M, s |= φ.
3.3. Axiomatization
To axiomatize this class of models, we first need to explain how pre- and postconditions of transitions can be expressed
in the language of PDL-3APL.
Definition 12 (Translation Functions fb, fg , fp). The beliefs, goals and plans of agent programs can be translated into PDL-
3APL expressions using translation functions fb, fg and fp defined as follows:
• fb: Let p ∈ P and φ,ψ be belief query expressions (i.e., ⟨query⟩) of 3APL: fb(p) = Bp; fb(φ and ψ) = fb(φ) ∧ fb(ψ);
fb(φ or ψ) = fb(φ) ∨ fb(ψ). For negations of formulas in ⟨query⟩, we also need the case fb(¬φ) = ¬fb(φ). For
translating pre- and postconditions of actions, we need to extend fb to sets of literals; if X is a set of literals, fb(X) =
p∈X Bp ∧

– p∈X ¬Bp.
• fg(p) = Gp; fg( – p) = G – p.
• fp: Let α be a belief update action, φ and ψ be belief query expressions, α¯ an abstract plan, and π, π1, π2 be plan
expressions (i.e., ⟨plan⟩) of 3APL:
– fp(α) = α
– fp(φ?) = t(φ)
– fp(α¯) = α¯
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– fp(π1;π2) = fp(π1); fp(π2)
– fp(if φ then π1 else π2)= t(φ); fp(π1)) ∪ (t(¬φ); fp(π2))
– fp(while φ do π)= (t(φ); fp(π))∗; t(¬φ).
We can now axiomatize the class of modelsM3APL(R) relative to an agent program with signature R. Note that PDL-3APL
contains belief, goal and plan modalities and several kinds of ‘atomic programs’ (belief update actions, belief test actions,
abstract plans, planning goal rules and plan revision rules). Each of those ingredients requires one or two axioms, hence the
length of the axiomatization. In the following definition, we use labels PDLi for standard PDL axioms, Ai for state axioms,
BAi for basic action axioms, CPi for composite plan axioms, PGi for planning goal rule axioms, and PRi for plan revision rule
axioms.
Definition 13 (PDL-3APL Axiomatic System). Let ψnp be any formula not containing plan expressions, ψnpx be any formula
not containing plan expressions or x, and ψnx be any formula not containing x. Let π be a plan expression (if π is null, Pκπ
is Pϵ). Then the following axioms and inference rules constitute the axiomatic system of PDL-3APL.
CL all tautologies of classical propositional logic
PDL1 [ρ](φ → ψ)→ ([ρ]φ → [ρ]ψ)
PDL2 ⟨ρ1; ρ2⟩φ ↔ ⟨ρ1⟩⟨ρ2⟩φ
PDL3 ⟨ρ1 ∪ ρ2⟩φ ↔ ⟨ρ1⟩φ ∨ ⟨ρ2⟩φ
PDL4 ⟨ρ∗⟩φ ↔ φ ∨ ⟨ρ⟩⟨ρ∗⟩φ
PDL5 [ρ∗](φ → [ρ]φ)→ (φ → [ρ∗]φ)
MP φ, φ→ψ
ψ
N φ[ρ]φ
A1 Bp → ¬Gp
A2 G – p → Bp
A3a Pκπ → ¬Pκ ′π ′ where π ′ ≠ π or κ ′ ≠ κ
A3b Pϵ ∨π◃κ∈Plan Pκπ
BA1 ¬x ∧ Pκ(α;π) ∧ fb(preci(α)) ∧ ψ ∧ ψ ′→ ⟨α⟩((fb(postij(α)) ∧ ¬fb(κ) ∧ Pκπ ∧ ψ) ∨ (fb(postij(α)) ∧ fb(κ) ∧ x ∧ Pϵ ∧ ψ ′))
whereψ ,ψ ′ are any formulas not containing plan expressions or literals in fb(postij(α)), and in additionψ ′ does
not contain x
BA2a ¬x ∧ Pκπ → [u]⊥where π ≠ u;π ′ and u ∈ Ac ∪ A¯c
BA2b ¬x∧ Pκπ → [t(φ)]⊥ if π does not start with a belief test action φ? or a conditional plan test onψ where φ = ψ
or φ = ¬ψ
BA3 ¬x ∧ Pκ(α;π) ∧ fb(preci(α)) ∧

j ψj ∧

j ψ
′
j →
[α](j( fb(postij(α)) ∧ ¬fb(κ) ∧ Pκπ ∧ ψj) ∨
j( fb(postij(α)) ∧ fb(κ) ∧ x ∧ Pϵ ∧ ψ ′j ))
where ψj and ψ ′j are any formulas not containing plan expressions or literals in fb(postij(α)), and in addition ψ
′
j
does not contain x
BA4 ¬x ∧ Pκ(φ?;π) ∧ fb(φ) ∧ ψnp → ⟨[t(φ)]⟩(Pκπ ∧ ψnp)
BA5 ¬x ∧ Pκ(α;π) ∧i ¬fb(preci(α)) ∧ ψnx → ⟨[α]⟩(x ∧ ψnx)
BA6 ¬x ∧ Pκ(φ?;π) ∧ ¬fb(φ) ∧ ψnx → ⟨[t(φ)]⟩(x ∧ ψnx)
BA7 ¬x ∧ Pκ(α¯;π) ∧ ψnx → ⟨[α¯]⟩(x ∧ ψnx)
BA8 x ∧ ψ → ⟨[u]⟩ψ where u is α, t(φ) or α¯
CP1 ¬x ∧ Pκ(πif ;π) ∧ fb(φ) ∧ ψnp → ⟨[t(φ)]⟩(Pκπ1;π ∧ ψnp), where πif is of the form if φ then π1 else π2
CP2 ¬x ∧ Pκ(πif ;π) ∧ ¬fb(φ) ∧ ψnp → ⟨[t(¬φ)]⟩(Pκπ2;π ∧ ψnp), where πif is as in CP1
CP3 ¬x ∧ Pκ(πwh;π) ∧ fb(φ) ∧ ψnp → ⟨[t(φ)]⟩(Pκπ1;πwh;π ∧ ψnp), where πwh is of the form while φ do π1
CP4 ¬x ∧ Pκ(πwh;π) ∧ ¬fb(φ) ∧ ψnp → ⟨[t(¬φ)]⟩(Pκπ ∧ ψnp), where πwh is as in CP3
CP5 ¬x ∧ (Pκπif ∨ Pκπwh) ∧ ¬fb(φ)→ [t(φ)]⊥where πif and πwh are as above
PG1 Pϵ ∧ fg(κi) ∧ fb(βi) ∧ ψnpx → ⟨[δr i]⟩(¬x ∧ Pκiπi ∧ ψnpx)
PG2 ¬Pϵ ∨ ¬fg(κi) ∨ ¬fb(βi)→ [δr i]⊥
PR1 x ∧ Pκπj ∧ fb(βj) ∧ ψnpx → ⟨[δpj]⟩(¬x ∧ Pκπ ′j ∧ ψnpx)
PR2 ¬x ∨ ¬Pκπj ∨ ¬fb(βj)→ [δpj]⊥
Theorem 1. PDL-3APL is sound with respect toM3APL(R).
The proof of soundness is by straightforward induction on the length of a derivation. It is obvious that the inference
rules derive valid conclusions from valid premises. It remains to show that the axioms are valid. In the following, we only
show validity of some of the axioms that are characteristic for our framework. The validity proofs of other axioms are either
the same as the corresponding axioms of PDL or they are similar to those we prove here. We first formulate the following
proposition which will be used in the validity proofs of several axioms.
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Proposition 1. Let M be a model inM3APL(R), s be a state in M, Vb be the belief valuation function of M, and X be a set of literals.
Then,
M, s |= fb(X) iff Vb(s) |=cwa X .
Proof. M, s |= fb(X) def . 12⇔ M, s |= p∈X Bp ∧– p∈X ¬Bp def . 11⇔ M, s |= p∈X Bp andM, s |= −p∈X ¬Bp def . 11⇔ p∈X p ∈
Vb(s) and

– p∈X p ∉ Vb(s) def . 3⇔ ∀p ∈ X : Vb(s) |=cwa p and ∀ – p ∈ X : Vb(s) |=cwa −p def . 3⇔ Vb(s) |=cwa X . 
The following propositions establish the validity of axioms BA1, BA2a, BA3, CP1, CP4, PG1, PG2, PR1, and PR2.
Proposition 2. Axiom BA1 is valid.
Proof. M, s |= ¬x ∧ Pκ(α;π) ∧ fb(preci(α)) ∧ ψ ∧ ψ ′ def . 11⇔ M, s |= ¬x andM, s |= Pκ(α;π) andM, s |=
fb(preci(α)) andM, s |= ψ andM, s |= ψ ′. From Definition 11 and Proposition 1 we can conclude x ∉ Vc(s) and Vp(s) ={α;π ◃ κ} and Vb(s) |=cwa preci(α). Then, condition C2 ensures that there exists a state s′ such that Rα(s, s′), where either
clauses 1, 2 and 3, or clauses 1, 2 and 4 below hold.
1 Vb(s′) = Ti,j(α, Vb(s)) for some postcondition j of α
2 Vg(s′) = Vg(s) \ ({p : p ∈ Vb(s′)} ∪ { – p : p ∉ Vb(s′)})
3 Vb(s′) |̸=cwa κ and Vp(s′) = {π ◃ κ}
4 Vb(s′) |=cwa κ , x ∈ Vc(s′) and Vp(s′) = {} .
From Proposition 1, Definitions 11 and 12, and that Ti,j ensures Vb(s′) |=cwa postij(α) (see Definition 4), and the clauses
above, we have that:
1 M, s′ |= fb(postij(α)) for some postcondition j of α
2 Vg(s′) = Vg(s) \ ({p : p ∈ Vb(s′)} ∪ { – p : p ∉ Vb(s′)})
3 M, s′ |= ¬fb(κ) andM, s′ |= Pκπ
4 M, s′ |= fb(κ), andM, s′ |= x, andM, s′ |= Pϵ.
Moreover, from clauses 1 and 2 we can conclude that for all ψ not in the postcondition of action α and not a plan formula
M, s |= ψ iff M, s′ |= ψ . Similarly for all formulas ψ ′ which do not contain the boolean flag x. Thus there exists a state s′
such that Rα(s, s′) and eitherM, s′ |= fb(postij(α))∧¬fb(κ)∧ Pκπ ∧ψ orM, s′ |= fb(postij(α))∧ fb(κ)∧ x∧ Pϵ ∧ψ ′. In
other words,M, s |= ⟨α⟩(fb(postij(α)) ∧ ¬fb(κ) ∧ Pκπ ∧ ψ) ∨ (fb(postij(α)) ∧ fb(κ) ∧ x ∧ Pϵ ∧ ψ ′). 
Proposition 3. Axiom BA2a is valid.
Proof. Suppose M, s |= ¬x ∧ Pκπ where π ≠ u;π ′, but M, s |= ¬[u]⊥ which is equivalent to M, s |= ⟨u⟩⊤. Following
Definition 11 there exists a state s′ such that Ru(s, s′). We consider the two possible cases where u ∈ Ac and u ∈ A¯c. Case 1
(u ∈ Ac): from Definition 9 only those pairs of states that satisfy conditions C2, C4, and C8 are in Ru. However, the existence
of an Ru edge is not implied by C2 and C4 because these requireM, s |= Pκu;π ′ which is contrary to our assumption5 that
M, s |= Pκπ where π ≠ u;π ′. An Ru edge is also not implied by C8 because this requiresM, s |= x which is again contrary
to our assumption thatM, s |= ¬x. Case 2 follows a similar line of reasoning with respect to conditions C6 and C8. 
Proposition 4. Axiom BA3 is valid.
Proof. Assume the antecedent holds inM, s, but not the consequent. From Definition 11 the negation of the consequent is
M, s |= ⟨α⟩j ¬( fb(postij(α)) ∧ ¬fb(κ) ∧ Pκπ ∧ ψj) ∧ j ¬( fb(postij(α)) ∧ fb(κ) ∧ x ∧ Pϵ ∧ ψ ′j )) def .11⇔ ∃s′ : Rα(s, s′)
andM, s |=j ¬( fb(postij(α))∧¬fb(κ)∧Pκπ ∧ψj) ∧j ¬( fb(postij(α))∧ fb(κ)∧ x∧Pϵ∧ψ ′j )). Definition 9 states that
only those Rα transitions exist that satisfy conditions C2, C4 and C8. Only C2 can be satisfied since C2 requires Vb(s) |=cwa
preci(α) which is satisfied by the assumption M, s |= fb(preci(α)) using Proposition 1; other conditions are clearly not
satisfied. However, C2 requires Vb(s′) = Ti,j(α, Vb(s)) for some postcondition j of α. Since Ti,j(α, Vb(s)) |= postij(α) (see
Definition 4), we haveM, s′ |= fb(postij(α)) for some postcondition j of α. Moreover, C2 requires either (Vb(s′) |̸=cwa κ and
Vp(s′) = {π◃κ}) or (Vb(s′) |=cwa κ, x ∈ Vc(s′) andVp(s′) = {}). Finally, clauses 1, 2, and3ofC2 require that only the valuation
of formulas containing plan expressions or those involved inpostij(α) canbe changed, and clauses 1, 2, and4 require that the
valuation of only formulas containing plan expressions, x, and those involved in postij(α) can be changed; the valuation
of all other formulas remains unchanged. Altogether, C2 requires either M, s′ |= ( fb(postij(α)) ∧ ¬fb(κ) ∧ Pκπ ∧ ψ )
or ( M, s′ |= fb(postij(α)) ∧ fb(κ) ∧ x ∧ Pκϵ ∧ ψ ′ ), for some postcondition j of α, ψ not containing plan expressions
or propositions from postij(α), and ψ
′ not containing plan expressions, execution flags, or those from postij(α). This is
contrary to our assumption that the consequent does not hold. 
5 Note that there exists only one plan and this plan does not start with u ∈ Ac.
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Proposition 5. Axiom CP1 is valid.
Proof. Assume M, s |= ¬x ∧ Pκ(πif ;π) ∧ fb(φ) ∧ ψnp. From Definition 11 and Proposition 1, we have x ∉ Vc(s), Vp(s) =
{πif ;π ◃ κ}, Vb(s) |=cwa φ, and M, s |= ψnp. Condition C7, clause 1, requires there is an Rt(φ) transition to state s′ where
Vp(s′) = {π1;π ◃ κ}, and hence according to Definition 11 and Proposition 1,M, s′ |= Pκπ1;π andM, s |= ⟨t(φ)⟩Pκπ1;π .
Moreover, as the only expressions for which the valuation are changed as a result of this transition are plan expressions, we
have for all other expressions ψnp if M, s |= ψnp then M, s′ |= ψnp. Hence M, s |= ⟨t(φ)⟩Pκπ1;π ∧ ψnp for all non-plan
expressionsψnp, Definition 5 states that only those Rt(φ) transitions exist that satisfy conditions C3, C5, C7 and C8. However,
since only C7 applies (note that C3 and C5 require M, s |= Pκφ?;π and C8 requires M, s |= x which are contrary to our
assumption), we also haveM, s |= [t(φ)]Pκπ1;π ∧ ψnp for all non-plan expressions ψnp. 
Proposition 6. Axiom CP4 is valid.
Proof. AssumeM, s |= ¬x∧ Pκ(πwh;π)∧¬fb(φ)∧ψnp. From Definition 11 and Proposition 1, we have x ∉ Vc(s), Vp(s) =
{πwh;π ◃ κ}, Vb(s) |̸=cwa φ, andM, s |= ψnp. Condition C7, clause 4, requires there is an Rt(¬φ) transition to state s′ where
Vp(s′) = {π ◃ κ}, and hence according to Definition 11 and Proposition 1,M, s′ |= Pκπ andM, s |= ⟨t(¬φ)⟩Pκπ . Moreover,
since the only expressions for which the valuation is changed are plan expressions, we have for all other expressions ψnp if
M, s |= ψnp thenM, s′ |= ψnp. HenceM, s |= ⟨t(¬φ)⟩Pκπ ∧ ψnp for all non-plan expressionsψnp. Definition 10 states that
only those Rt(¬φ) transitions exist that are implied by conditions C3, C5, C7 and C8. However, since only C7 applies (note
that C3 and C5 require M, s |= Pκφ?;π and C8 requires M, s |= x which are contrary to our assumption), we also have
M, s |= [t(¬φ)]Pκπ ∧ ψnp for all non-plan expressions ψnp. 
Proposition 7. Axiom PG1 is valid.
Proof. AssumeM, s |= Pϵ ∧ fg(κi) ∧ fb(βi) ∧ψnpx. From Definition 11 and Proposition 1, we have Vp(s) = {}, Vg(s) |= κi,
Vb(s) |=cwa βi, andM, s |= ψnpx. According to condition C9, there exists an Rδr i transition to a state s′ where Vp(s′) = {πi◃κi}
and x ∉ Vc(s′) def .,11⇔ ∃s′ : Rδr i(s, s′) such thatM, s′ |= Pκiπi ∧ ¬x def .,11⇔ M, s |= ⟨δr i⟩Pκiπi ∧ ¬x. Moreover, as only formulas
containing plan expressions and x change as a result of this transition, we have for all other formulas ψnpx, if M, s |= ψnpx
thenM, s′ |= ψnpx. henceM, s |= ⟨δr i⟩Pκiπi ∧ ¬x ∧ ψnpx for all formulas ψnpx not containing plan expressions or x. Finally,
since only C9 applies, we have also M, s |= [δr i]Pκiπi ∧ ¬x ∧ ψnpx for all formulas ψnpx not containing plan expressions or
execution flag. 
Proposition 8. Axiom PG2 is valid.
Proof. Assume M, s |= ¬Pϵ ∨ ¬fg(κi) ∨ ¬fb(βi), but ¬[δr i]⊥ ⇔ ⟨δr i⟩⊤. Then there exists an Rδr i transition to a
state s′. However, according to Definition 9, the only Rδr i transitions are those implied by condition C9 which requires
Vp(s) = {}, Vg(s) |= κi, Vb(s) |=cwa βi, and hence according to Definition 11 and Proposition 1,M, s |= Pϵ ∧ fg(κi) ∧ fb(βi).
However, this contradicts our assumption. 
Proposition 9. Axiom PR1 is valid.
Proof. Assume M, s |= x ∧ Pκπj ∧ fb(βj) ∧ ψnpx. From Definition 11 and Proposition 1, we have x ∈ Vc(s), Vp(s) =
{πj ◃ κ}, Vb(s) |=cwa βj, and M, s |= ψnpx. According to condition C10, there exists an Rδpj transition to a state s′ where
Vp(s′) = {π ′j ◃ κ} and x ∉ Vc(s′) def . 11⇔ ∃s′ : Rδpj(s, s′) such thatM, s′ |= Pκπ ′j ∧ ¬x
def . 11⇔ M, s |= ⟨δpj⟩Pκπ ′j ∧ ¬x. Moreover,
since only formulas containing plan expressions and x change as a result of this transition, we have for all other formulas
ψnpx, if M, s |= ψnpx then M, s′ |= ψnpx. Hence M, s |= ⟨δpj⟩Pκπ ′j ∧ ¬x ∧ ψnpx for all formulas ψnpx not containing plan
expressions or boolean flag x. Finally, since only C10 can imply Rδpj transitions, we also haveM, s |= [δpj]Pκπ ′j ∧ ¬x ∧ ψnpx
for all formulas ψnpx not containing plan expressions or x. 
Proposition 10. Axiom PR2 is valid.
Proof. AssumeM, s |= ¬x∨¬Pκπj ∨¬fb(βj), but¬[δpj]⊥which is equivalent to ⟨δpj⟩⊤. Then there exists a Rδpj transition
to a state s′. However, according to Definition 9, the only Rδpj transitions are those implied by condition C10which requires
x ∉ Vc(s), Vp(s) = {πj◃κ}, Vb(s) |=cwa βj, and hence according to Definition 11 and Proposition 1,M, s |= ¬x∧Pκπj∧fb(βi).
However, this contradicts our assumption. 
This concludes our discussion of the soundness of the axiomatic system for PDL-3APL. The rest of this section will be
devoted to the proof of weak completeness of the axiomatization.
Since our logic includes PDL, we cannot prove strong completeness (for every set of formulas Γ and formula φ, if Γ |= φ
then Γ ⊢ φ) because PDL is not compact. Instead, we prove weak completeness: every valid formula φ is derivable
(|= φ ⇒⊢ φ).
The proof is based on the standard completeness proof for PDL, see for example [17]. We show that any PDL-3APL
consistent formula φ has a satisfying model Mφ . The construction proceeds as follows. Given a formula φ, we define a set
of formulas Closure(φ) (defined below) which is similar to a set used in the standard PDL completeness proof, but has some
extra conditions specific to PDL-3APL. The satisfying model Mφ for φ is constructed using Closure(φ), namely the states of
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Mφ are maximal consistent subsets of Closure(φ). We define the assignments and binary relations for Mφ similarly to the
standard PDL proof. We omit the proofs of the standard PDL-specific lemmas. Instead, we concentrate on the PDL-3APL
specific part of the proof which shows thatMφ satisfies conditions C1–C10 onM3APL(R)models.
The set Closure(φ) used in the construction of Mφ includes subformulas of φ and a finite number of other formulas
specified below. First of all, we define the set Subf (φ) of subformulas of φ in the usual way, but considering subformulas of
the form Bp, Gp and G – p as atomic formulas (that is, p and – p are not included in the set of subformulas). Conditions 1–4
below correspond to the Fischer–Ladner closure conditions used in the standard completeness proof for PDL [18], condition
5 corresponds to closure under single negations, and conditions 6–12 are specific to the proof for PDL-3APL.
1. Subf (φ) ⊆ Closure(φ)
2. if ⟨ρ1; ρ2⟩ψ ∈ Closure(φ) then ⟨ρ1⟩⟨ρ2⟩ψ ∈ Closure(φ)
3. if ⟨ρ1 ∪ ρ2⟩ψ ∈ Closure(φ) then ⟨ρ1⟩ψ ∨ ⟨ρ2⟩ψ ∈ Closure(φ)
4. if ⟨ρ∗⟩ψ ∈ Closure(φ) then ⟨ρ⟩⟨ρ∗⟩ψ ∈ Closure(φ)
5. if ψ ∈ Closure(φ) and ψ is not of the form ¬χ , then ¬ψ ∈ Closure(φ)
6. if G – p ∈ Closure(φ), then Bp ∈ Closure(φ)
7. x ∈ Closure(φ)
8. if an action α occurs in φ, then Closure(φ) contains fb translations of all pre- and postconditions for α, e.g., if one of α’s
preconditions is {p, – q} then Bp,¬Bq ∈ Closure(φ)
9. Pϵ ∈ Closure(φ)
10. Pπ ∈ Closure(φ) for all π ∈ Plan
11. if ⟨t(φ′)⟩ψ ∈ Closure(φ) then fb(φ′) ∈ Closure(φ)
12. if Pκπ ∈ Closure(φ) then for all formulasφ′ ∈⟨query⟩which occur in a plan expression inClosure(φ), fb(φ′) ∈ Closure(φ).
Given a consistent formula φ, we defineMφ as follows:
Definition 14 (Canonical PDL-3APL Model for φ). A canonical PDL-3APL model for φ,Mφ is defined as
Mφ = (Wφ, V φ,Rφα ,Rφt(φ),Rφα¯ ,Rφδr i ,Rφδpj)
where:
Wφ is the set of all maximal consistent subsets of Closure(φ)
V φ is defined as follows:
• p ∈ V φb (A) iff Bp ∈ A, where Bp ∈ Closure(φ);
• ( – )p ∈ V φg (A) iff G( – )p ∈ A, where G( – )p ∈ Closure(φ);
• V φp (A) = {π ◃ κ} iff Pκπ ∈ A, where Pκπ ∈ Closure(φ); V φp (A) = ∅ iff Pϵ ∈ A.
The transition relations Rφα ,R
φ
t(φ),R
φ
α¯ ,R
φ
δr i
,R
φ
δpj
are defined as follows. Let A, B be maximal consistent subsets of
Closure(φ), and ρ be a program expression. We first define auxiliary relations Sρ(A, B) for each program expression ρ as
follows. Let us denote by ∧A the conjunction of all formulas in A. Then Sρ(A, B) holds if and only if ∧A is consistent with
⟨ρ⟩ ∧B (the conjunction of formulas in B preceded by ⟨ρ⟩).
Now using the auxiliary relations, we define relations Rφρ :
• for every u= α, t(φ), α¯, δr i, δpj: Rφu = Su;
• Rφρ1;ρ2 = Rφρ1 ◦ Rφρ2 where ◦ is relational composition;
• Rφρ1∪ρ2 = Rφρ1 ∪ Rφρ2 ;
• Rφρ∗ = (Rφρ)∗.
The following three lemmas have exactly the same proof as Lemmas 4.88, 4.89 and 4.90 in [17]:
Lemma 1 (Inclusion Lemma). For every ρ , Sρ ⊆ Rφρ .
Lemma 2 (Existence Lemma). Let A be a maximal consistent set and ρ a program expression. Then for all ⟨ρ⟩ψ ∈ Closure(φ),
⟨ρ⟩ψ ∈ A iff there is a maximal consistent set A′ such that Rφρ(A, A′) and ψ ∈ A′.
Lemmas 1 and 2 are used in the proof of the following crucial lemma:
Lemma 3 (Truth Lemma). Let ψ ∈ Closure(φ). Then for every maximal consistent set A: Mφ, A |= ψ iff ψ ∈ A.
Since our formula φ is consistent, it belongs to at least one maximal consistent set A, so it is satisfied in some state inMφ .
The last component for the completeness proof is the following proposition:
Proposition 11. Mφ satisfies conditions C1–C10.
Proof. Since every A is consistent with respect to A1, A cannot contain Bp and Gp so it is not possible that p ∈ V φb (A) and
p ∈ V φg (A). Similarly, if G – p ∈ A, then Bp ∈ A by A2, so condition C1 holds in Mφ . By A3a and A3b each state contains a
unique plan expression.
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Let us prove that C2 holds inMφ . Suppose V φp (A) = {α;π ◃ κ}, V φb (A) entails preci(α) and x ∉ V φc (A). We need to show
that for every postij(α) there exists a maximal consistent set B inM
φ such that
1. Vb(B) = Ti,j(α, Vb(A))
2. Vg(B) = Vg(A) \ ({p : p ∈ Vb(B)} ∪ { – p : p ∉ Vb(B)})
3. if Vb(B) |̸=cwa κ , then Vp(B) = {π ◃ κ}
4. if Vb(B) |=cwa κ , then x ∈ Vc(B) and Vp(B) = {}.
Given the construction ofMφ , the conditions on B above are equivalent to the following:
1. fb(postij(α)) ∈ B and for every pwhich does not occur in fb(postij(α)), Bp ∈ B iff Bp ∈ A
2. if p ∈ postij(α), Gp ∉ B; if – p ∈ postij(α), G – p ∉ B; for all other p, G( – )p ∈ B iff G( – )p ∈ A
3. if ¬fb(κ) ∈ B, then Pκπ ∈ B
4. if fb(κ) ∈ B, then x ∈ B and Pϵ ∈ B.
Recall that for any set B, Rφα(A, B) if ∧A ∧ ⟨α⟩∧B is consistent. We need to show that there is a maximal consistent set of
formulas Bwhich satisfies this condition and also either conditions 1, 2 and 3 or 1, 2 and 4 above.
From V φp (A) = {α;π ◃ κ} and the model definition we conclude that Pκα;π ∈ A. Since x, fb(preci(α)) ∈ Closure(φ),
fb(preci(α)) ∈ A and¬x ∈ A. So∧A implies Pκα;π∧fb(preci(α))∧¬x. Let Fj be the set of pwhich do not occur in postij(α).
Then ∧A also implies the following formula ψA, describing the set of beliefs and goals true in A which are not going to be
affected by executing α if the outcome is described by the postcondition j:
ψA =

p∈Fj,Bp∈A
Bp ∧

p∈Fj,G(– )p∈A
G( – )p.
Consider an instance of the axiom BA1where for the formulaψ we useψA ∧¬x and for the formulaψ ′ we useψA. Clearly,
A implies its antecedent:
¬x ∧ Pκα;π ∧ fb(preci(α)) ∧ (ψA ∧ ¬x) ∧ ψA.
This means that ∧A implies the consequent of the axiom. Since A is consistent, this means that ∧A is consistent either with
⟨α⟩(fb(postij(α)) ∧ ¬fb(κ) ∧ Pκπ ∧ ¬x ∧ ψA)
or with
⟨α⟩(fb(postij(α)) ∧ fb(κ) ∧ Pϵ ∧ x ∧ ψA).
Note that because of axioms A1 and A2 if ∧A is consistent with ⟨α⟩(Bp ∧ ¬Bq) it is also consistent with ⟨α⟩(Bp ∧ ¬Gp ∧
¬Bq ∧ ¬G – q), so all negative statements about goals which are dropped because of executing α can also be added. Note
that those statements only involve variables which are not in Fj. In either case, we have that∧A∧ ⟨α⟩ψ is consistent, where
ψ is a formula which describes the conditions on the desired state B. The only problem is that ψ does not contain, for
every single formula from Closure(φ), this formula or its negation as a conjunct; in other words, it does not yet describe a
maximal consistent set. However, using a standard technique called ‘forcing choices’ we can extendψ to such a set. Namely,
we enumerate all formulas from Closure(φ): χ1, . . . , χn. Set ψ0 = ψ . For each formula χi either ∧A ∧ ⟨α⟩(ψi−1 ∧ χi) or
∧A ∧ ⟨α⟩(ψi−1 ∧ ¬χi) is consistent, provided ∧A ∧ ⟨α⟩ψi−1 is consistent (from basic modal logic). Construct a conjunction
containing every formula from Closure(φ) or its negation by extending ψ while maintaining consistency. Finally, ψn will
give us a conjunction of formulas in a maximal consistent set Bwhich satisfies the conditions of C2.
This argument shows that Rα transitions required by the model conditions exist in Mφ . We also need to show that only
those Rα transitions do exist from non-x states. Axiom BA2a makes sure that there are no Rα transitions from the states
where the plan does not start with α (if the conjunction of formulas in A implies [α]⊥, this means that this conjunction is
not consistent with any formula of the form ⟨α⟩ψ). Axiom BA3 ensures that all states reachable by α are as described in C2.
Next consider condition C3. Axiom BA2b ensures that Rt(φ′) transitions do not exist from the states where the plan
expression does not start with a test whether φ′ holds, and BA4 ensures that if A contains Pκ(φ′?;π) and fb(φ′), then there
exists a Rt(φ′) transition to a state Bwhich is identical to A except that the plan expression is Pκ(π), and only to such a state
B.
C4 and C5 require that if x is false and the next step in the current plan is not executable (preconditions of a belief update
action do not hold or the test formula in a belief test action is false) then the transition by this step should lead to a state
which is identical to the current one except that x holds there. This is ensured by axioms BA5 and BA6.
Themodel satisfies condition C6 because by BA7 a state A can have an abstract plan α¯ link to another state B if B is exactly
like A apart from being an x-state. Axiom BA2amakes sure that an α¯ transition is only possible if the current plan has α¯ as
its first step.
If A contains Pκπ;π ′ where π is a conditional plan with a test on φ′, axioms CP1–CP4 ensure that there exist Rt((¬)φ′)
transitions required by condition C7, and the only states reachable by them are as described in the condition. CP5 disables
an Rt(φ′) transition if π tests on φ′ and fb(φ′) is false, and vice versa, disables Rt(¬φ′) transition if π tests on φ′ and fb(φ′) is
true.
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In x-states, all actions and tests should be executable without changing the state. In other words every A such that x ∈ A
should have an Ru transition to itself for every u = α, t(φ), α¯. Clearly the conjunction of formulas in A is consistent with
⟨u⟩ ∧A, otherwise it will be inconsistent with axiom BA8. So condition C8 holds.
To satisfy condition C9, we need to ensure that first, the required transitions by Rδr i exist, and second, that only those
transitions exist. Axiom PG1 ensures that any A such that Pϵ ∈ A, where A satisfies the belief and goal conditions of the PG
rule ri, has a transition to a state which is identical to A apart from replacing Pϵ with the new plan expression and possibly
not containing x. If the conjunction of formulas in A is not consistent with the description of the resulting state, then A is
not consistent with PG1. PG1 also makes sure that all Rδr i transitions lead to such a state. Finally, PG2makes sure that other
states (which do not have an empty plan base, or do not satisfy the belief and goal conditions of ri) do not have any outgoing
Rδr i transitions.
Similarly for condition C10: PR1 ensures that if x ∈ A and A contains formulas which mean that the plan and belief
condition of a PR rule pj match, then there is a Rδpj transition to a state which is identical to A apart from replacing the plan
expression with the new one, and not containing x, and only such Rδpj exist. To make sure there are no Rδpj transitions from
any other states, we have axiom PR2. 
Lemma 3 and Proposition 11 give the proof of the weak completeness of PDL-3APL:
Theorem 2. PDL-3APL is weakly complete with respect toM3APL(R).
Proof. Wehave shown that every formulaφ consistentwith respect to PDL-3APL axioms has amodelMφ (since by Lemma3,
φ is satisfied in at least one state ofMφ). By Proposition 11,Mφ satisfies conditions C1–C10, in other words, it is aM3APL(R)
model. We have shown that if ⊬ ¬φ, then φ’s negation is not true in all models: |̸= ¬φ. By contraposition, if ¬φ is valid,
namely if |= ¬φ, then its negation is provable: ⊢ ¬φ. Since every PDL-3APL formula is equivalent to its double negation,
we have |= φ implies |= ¬¬φ implies ⊢ ¬¬φ implies ⊢ φ. 
The definitions of PDL-3APL models and the set of axioms are quite complex. The models have transitions corresponding
to the various components of 3APL programs (belief update actions, tests, abstract plans, planning goal rules and plan
revision rules) and the states have the beliefs, goals and plans of the agent. Each of those components requires a relatively
small set of conditions (motivated by the operational semantics) and a couple of axioms. However, due to the complexity
of 3APL, the complete list of axioms is rather long. On the positive side, this does provide us with a complete system for
reasoning about the whole language, rather than just a fragment of it as in [11]. In the remainder of the paper, we explain
how 3APL programs can be translated into PDL-3APL and how to verify 3APL programs using theorem proving in PDL-3APL.
4. Translating 3APL programs into PDL-3APL
In this section, we give a translation of a complete 3APL agent program into a PDL-3APL program expression. In this and
in subsequent sections, we will use R as a name both for a program (and the agent’s initial configuration) and its signature
(when we talk about the models of the logic corresponding to this signature).
Recall that in the initial configuration, the agent has an empty plan base, and, with a non-interleaved execution strategy,
execution of the agent’s program proceeds by the adoption and execution of a single appropriate plan (as determined by
the current beliefs and goals of the agent). If the goal for the currently executing plan is achieved, or the plan becomes non-
executable, the plan may be dropped or revised by a plan revision rule. The execution of an agent program R can therefore
be translated into PDL-3APL program expressions corresponding to the application of a PG rule and the execution of the
corresponding plan, possibly interleaved with the application of a PR rule and the consequent revision of the plan base
(∪i(δr i; fp(πi))

∪j(δpj; fp(π ′j )))+
where i ranges over all PG rules and j ranges over all PR rules in the program. We will refer to this expression as tr(R). tr(R)
picks out exactly those paths in a model which correspond to an execution of the program.
To show that our translation is faithful with respect to the operational semantics, we prove a correspondence theorem
relating transition systems generated by the operational semantics for program R and models inM3APL(R). First of all, note
that there is a clear correspondence relation between configurations in the operational semantics and states in M3APL(R)
models. Namely, given a configuration c = (σ , γ ,Π), we say that s ∼ c for a state s in a model M if s has the same belief,
goal and plan assignments as c .
We will also talk about matching paths in the operational semantics and inM3APL(R)models. By a path in an operational
semantics transition system S, we mean a sequence of configurations c1, label1, c2, label2, . . . , cm where cj+1 is obtained
from cj by one of the transition rules (1a)–(6c). For convenience, we label each transition by the corresponding operation;
the labels are, ((1a), α), ((1b), α), ((2), t(β)), ((3a), t(φ)), ((3b), t(¬φ)), ((4a), t(φ)), ((4b), t(¬φ)), ((5), δr i), ((6a), δpj(α)), ((6b),
δpj(t(β))), ((6c), δpj(α¯)). We claim that if there is a path c = c1, . . . , cn = c ′ in S with a certain sequence of labels, then
there is a corresponding path s = s1, . . . , sk = s′ inM such that s ∼ c and s′ ∼ c ′. It remains to define what we mean by a
‘corresponding path’.
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Definition 15. Let cj, labelj, cj+1 be a single step on a path in the 3APL operational semantics transition system S. The
corresponding path sj, . . . , sj+i inM depends on labelj and is defined as follows.
• cj, ((1a), α), cj+1: the corresponding path is sj, sj+1 where sj ∼ cj and sj+1 ∼ cj+1 and Rα(sj, sj+1).
• cj, ((1b), α), cj+1: the corresponding path is sj, sj+1, . . . , sj+1 where sj ∼ cj and sj+1 ∼ cj+1 and Rα(sj, sj+1), sj+1 satisfies x
and has an empty plan base, and is repeated as many times as there are steps remaining in the plan when the goal has
been achieved; the transitions from sj+1 to sj+1 on the path correspond to the remaining steps in the plan.6
• cj, ((2), t(β)), cj+1: the corresponding path is sj, sj+1 where sj ∼ cj and sj+1 ∼ cj+1 and Rt(β)(sj, sj+1).
• cj, ((3a), t(φ)), cj+1: the corresponding path is sj, sj+1 where sj ∼ cj and sj+1 ∼ cj+1 and Rt(φ)(sj, sj+1).
• cj, ((3b), t(¬φ)), cj+1: the corresponding path is sj, sj+1 where sj ∼ cj and sj+1 ∼ cj+1 and Rt(¬φ)(sj, sj+1).
• cj, ((4a), t(φ)), cj+1: the corresponding path is sj, sj+1 where sj ∼ cj and sj+1 ∼ cj+1 and Rt(φ)(sj, sj+1).
• cj, ((4b), t(¬φ)), cj+1: the corresponding path is sj, sj+1 where sj ∼ cj and sj+1 ∼ cj+1 and Rt(¬φ)(sj, sj+1).
• cj, ((5), δr i), cj+1: the corresponding path is sj, sj+1 where sj ∼ cj and sj+1 ∼ cj+1 and Rδr i(sj, sj+1).• cj, ((6a), δpk(α)), cj+1: the corresponding path is sj, t, . . . , t, sj+1 where sj ∼ cj and sj+1 ∼ cj+1 and Rα(sj, t), Rδpk(t, sj+1),
t is an x-state, and the transitions from t to t on the path correspond to the remaining steps in the original plan.
• cj, ((6b), δpk(t(β))), cj+1: the corresponding path is sj, t, . . . , t, sj+1 where sj ∼ cj and sj+1 ∼ cj+1 and Rt(β)(sj, t),
Rδpk(t, sj+1), t is an x-state, and the transitions from t to t on the path correspond to the remaining steps in the original
plan.
• cj, ((6c), δpk(α¯)), cj+1: the corresponding path is sj, t, . . . , t, sj+1 where sj ∼ cj and sj+1 ∼ cj+1 and Rα¯(sj, t), Rδpk(t, sj+1),
t is an x-state, and the transitions from t to t on the path correspond to the remaining steps in the original plan.
The following theorem states that if a transition system S and a PDL-3APL model M are generated by the same initial
configuration, then the set of configurations with an empty plan base reachable from the initial state in S is the same as the
set of states reachable from the initial state by Rtr(R). (By a model generated by a state s0 we mean a model where all states
are reachable from s0).
Theorem 3. Let R be a 3APL program, S a transition system generated by the operational semantics of R with initial configuration
c0. Let M be a model generated by state s0 ∼ c0. Then a configuration c with an empty plan base is reachable in S from c0 iff a
state s ∼ c is reachable in M from s0 by tr(R).
Proof. The theorem has two directions:
1. If s0 ∼ c0 and there is a path in S from c0 to c where c has an empty plan base, then there is an s with s ∼ c such that
Rtr(R)(s0, s).
2. If s0 ∼ c0 and Rtr(R)(s0, s), then there exists a path in S from c0 to c such that s ∼ c.
1. Assume s0 ∼ c0 and there is a path in S from c0 to c where c has an empty plan base. We need to show that there is an
swith s ∼ c such that Rtr(R)(s0, s).
The proof is by induction on the number of labels in the path in S, using the preconditions of the transitions of the
operational semantics and conditions onM3APL(R). We show that for every configuration c , the set of transitions possible in
c is included in the set of transitions possible in a state s ∼ c , and moreover the configurations reachable from c are in the
relation∼with the states reachable by the corresponding transitions from s and the resulting path is in Rtr(R).
The initial configuration c0 has an empty plan base, and the only applicable transition is a step by ((5), δr i) to a
configuration s1 with plan πi. It is easy to see that given that s0 ∼ c0 and condition C9 on models, there is a corresponding
step in M to a state s1 such that s1 ∼ c1. Note that tr(R) is a union of δr i; fp(πi) with δpj; fp(πj). We have now made a first
step in M which matches an initial segment δr i of δr i; fp(πi). In order for the matching path in M to be in tr(R), it has to
contain all the steps in fp(πi). If the next steps on a path in S correspond to a ‘normal’ execution of πi, that is, they follow the
operational semantics rules (1a), (2), (3a), (3b), (4a), (4b), thenmatching steps exist inM by conditions C2, C3, C7. If the goal
of the plan is achieved by α before the plan finishes executing, the step in S is of the form ((1b), α). By C2, a transition to an
x-state exists, and from the x-state there is a path to itself corresponding to the rest of fp(πi) steps by condition C8. The final
state on this path is in the∼ relation to a configuration with an empty plan base in S, so the inductive hypothesis applies.
Similarly, if one of the steps in plan πi in S blocks, we have one of the steps ((6a), δpk(α)), ((6b), δpk(t(φ))), ((6c), δpk(α¯)) to
a configuration c ′ with plan π ′j . In all of those cases, inM by one of C4, C5, C6, there is a transition to an x-state t , and from
t a path to itself by the rest of fp(πi) by C8, and there is also a transition from t to a state s′ with s′ ∼ c ′ by C10. In this case,
we start ‘tracing’ a δpj; fp(π ′j ) path inM , in exactly the same way as for δr i; fp(πi).
6 We require this to ensure that stateswith empty plan bases are reachable by a path in tr(R), where paths are the executions of PDL program expressions
(which correspond to every plan in states that achieves its goal) to completion. For example, if in configuration c with an empty belief base, a goal base
containing p, and a plan α1;α2 with its associated goal p, executing α1 achieves p, then in the resulting configuration c ′ the belief base contains p, the goal
base and the plan base are empty. In the model, we go from a state smatching c to an x-state s′ with the same belief, goal and plan assignment as in c ′ , but
we make an extra step to ‘consume’ the rest of the PDL program expression, namely α2 , so the corresponding path in a model is s, α1 , s′ , α2 , s′ . Note that
this way s′ is reachable by a path α1;α2 which corresponds to a completely executed PDL program expression.
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2. Assume s0 ∼ c0 and Rtr(R)(s0, s). We need to show that there exists a path in S from c0 to c such that s ∼ c . Again
observe that every path where the begin and end states are in Rtr(R)(s0, s) starts with an δr i or δpj transition, and since c0 has
an empty plan base, so does s0, so there are no Rδpj edges out of s0 and the only possibility is an δr i transition. Then since the
belief and goal bases are the same in c0 and s0, there is a matching transition possible from c0, to a configuration c1 where
the plan is πi. The next step inM is the first transition in fp(πi) to some state s′. If s′ is not an x state, that is, the transition is
enabled by one of C2 (clause 3), C3, or C7, then there is a matching step in S to a matching c ′ by one of (1a), (2), (3a)–(4b). If
s′ is an x state by C2 (clause 4), then there is a matching step in S to c ′ by (1b), s′ ∼ c ′. If s′ is an x state by C4, C5, or C6, then
there is a transition from s′ to s′′ by Rδpj and a matching step in S to c
′ by (6a), (6b) or (6c), so that s′′ ∼ c ′. 
5. Verification of 3APL programs
Given the above translation of 3APL programs into PDL-3APL, we can verify properties of agent programs, such as ‘all
executions of a program R result in a state satisfying propertyψ ’, [tr(R)]ψ , or ‘there is an execution of Rwhich achievesψ ’,
⟨tr(R)⟩ψ . More precisely, we can show that, given the initial beliefs and goals of the agent, the application of its planning
goal rules and the execution of the resulting plans reach states in which the agent has certain beliefs and goals. Since we are
using PDL, we cannot inspect every state along the path corresponding to an agent’s execution. Rather we sample the states
where either a PG or a PR rule are about to be applied. Note that these states are uniquely determined both in the operational
semantics and in the M3APL(R) models: in case of PG rules, they have an empty plan base; in case of PR rule, the plan base
contains a plan the first action of which is not executable. In other words, we sample states at the end of the agent’s ‘cycle’,
which consists of firing a PG or PR rule and executing the corresponding plan to completion or to the point of exceptional
termination when some plan action is not executable or the goal of the plan has been achieved half-way through execution.
To verify properties of 3APL programs expressed in PDL-3APL we can use a theorem prover such as MSPASS or PDL-
TABLEAU [19,20].7 Note that while there are currently no PDL theorem provers which can interpret belief, goal and plan
modalities, formulas starting with these modalities can always be encoded as propositional variables with extra axioms.
As an illustration, we show howwe can prove properties of the simple agent program introduced above.We shall use the
following abbreviations for propositions: a for attendConference, p for paper, c for clearance, d for deadlinePast,
s for submitted, y for accepted, f for fly and t for ticket. In addition, we use the following abbreviations for belief
update actions: wP for writePaper, rC for requestClearance, sP for submitPaper, rP for revisePaper, bT for
buyPlaneTicket, fC for flyToConference, and ttC for the abstract plan travelToConference. The agent’s program
consists of 6 belief update actions:
{ – p, – d} wP {{p}, {p, d}}
{p, – d, – c} rC {{ }, {d}, {c}, {d, c}}
{p, – d, c} sP {{ }, {y}}
{p, – d} rP {{ }, {d}}
{ – t} bT {{t}}
{t} fC {{a}}
a single PG rule r1:
r1 = a ← – p and – d |wP; rC; sP; if y then ttC
and four PR rules:
p1 = rC;π1 ← d | ϵ
p2 = sP;π2 ← d | ϵ
p3 = sP;π2 ← – d and – c | rP; rC; sP;π
p4 = ttC; ← f | bT ; fC
where π1 = sP;π2 and π2 = if y then ttC . The translation of the agent’s program is then
tr(R) = ((δr 1;wP; rC; sP; ((t(y); ttC) ∪ t(¬y)))
∪δp1 ∪ δp2
∪(δp3; rP; rC; sP; ((t(y); ttC) ∪ t(¬y))
∪(δp4; bT ; fC) )+
7 The use of theorem proving rather than model checking is motivated by the current state of the art regarding available verification frameworks and
tools for PDL. In particular, to the best of our knowledge there is no model-checking framework for PDL, while theorem proving techniques for PDL are
readily available.
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To reason about the execution of the agent program we need instances of axioms for the pre- and postconditions of the
agent’s actions. For example the following instances of BA1 defining pre- and postconditions of submitPaper:
¬x ∧ Pa(sP; ((t(y); ttC) ∪ t(¬y))) ∧ ¬Bp ∧ ¬Bd ∧ Bc ∧ ¬By
→ ⟨sP⟩(¬x ∧ Pa((t(y); ttC) ∪ t(¬y)) ∧ ¬By)
¬x ∧ Pa(sP; ((t(y); t) ∪ t(¬y)) ∧ ¬Bp ∧ ¬Bd ∧ Bc
→ ⟨sP⟩(¬x ∧ Pa((t(y); ttC) ∪ t(¬y)) ∧ By)
and the following instance of BA3:
¬x ∧ Pa(sP; ((t(y); ttC) ∪ t(¬y))) ∧ Bp ∧ ¬Bd ∧ Bc
→ [sP](¬x ∧ Pa((t(y); ttC) ∪ t(¬y)) ∧ (¬By ∨ By)).
If we specify the initial state as¬x∧Pϵ∧¬Ba∧¬Bp∧¬Bd∧¬Bc∧¬By∧¬Bt∧Bf it is possible to prove (using pre- and
postcondition axioms for other actions, omitted for brevity), that, for example, the agent will only attend the conference if
its paper is accepted:
¬x ∧ Pϵ ∧ ¬Bp ∧ ¬Bd → ⟨[tr(R)]⟩(Ba → By).
We can also prove that the agent may achieve its goal (intuitively, provided it receives clearance before the deadline, and
has the paper accepted):
¬x ∧ Pϵ ∧ ¬Bp ∧ B – d → ⟨tr(R)⟩Ba.
Clearly, to prove that the agent is guaranteed to achieve its goal, we need additional assumptions which can be expressed as
extra axioms: e.g., that agent always receives clearance and that papers it submits are always accepted.
6. Discussion
Our approach builds on and extends previous research on proving correctness of programs in APL-like and other BDI-
based agent programming languages, e.g., [21,11]. However much of this work has not considered plan revision. Levesque
et al. [21] have described GOLOG, a high level agent programming language in which basic actions are defined by action
precondition and successor state axioms. By reasoning in situation calculus, it is possible to prove that a (non-exceptional)
execution of a GOLOG program will achieve the agent’s goal. Recent work on verification of ConGolog programs [22]
expresses ConGolog programs in a logic which extends situation calculus, dynamic logic and temporal logic, and proposes
a model-checking algorithm for verifying properties of ConGolog programs. In [11,12] Alechina et al. gave a complete
axiomatization of a logic for reasoning about a subset of 3APL, but without nondeterministic actions or plan revision
rules. In [23] a dynamic logic for reasoning about programs written in Dribble was proposed. Dribble includes ‘practical
reasoning’ rules which allow the revision of agent programs. However no axiomatization of the logic was given. In [24], an
axiomatization of a logic for reasoning about Dribble programs is given, but based on a temporal logic CTL rather than on
dynamic logic.
Recovery from plan execution failure has also been investigated in the agent programming literature. For example, in
Jason [5] a plan execution failure generates a goal deletion event that may initiate ‘‘clean up’’ plans prior to attempting
another plan for the goal. In CanPlan2 [15] if the plan for a goal is deemed to have failed or is blocked (not executable), the
plan is abandoned and any alternative plans for achieving the goal are tried. In [9] Thangarajah et al. present an integrated
approach to aborting tasks and plan failure. Plans have an associated failure condition which triggers a failure method to
clean up, before the plan is dropped and another plan tried. However while an operational semantics is given for failure
recovery in [5,15,9], there is no corresponding logical analysis.
In contrast to these approaches, we have focused on a replanningmechanism that allows a failed plan to be either revised
to allow execution to continue, or dropped (possibly after performing clean up actions) and another applicable plan tried.
We have presented a logic that can be used to specify and verify properties of agent programs that employ this replanning
mechanism. We have provided a complete axiomatization of the logic and, using simple examples, we have shown how it
can be used to specify properties of agent programs under both normal and exceptional executions.
In this paper,we assumed that an agent executes a single plan at a time. In futureworkwe intend to extend the framework
to allow multiple plans whose executions can be interleaved along the lines of [12].
Acknowledgement
Natasha Alechina and Brian Logan were supported by EPSRC grant no. EP/E031226.
References
[1] M. Dastani, M.B. van Riemsdijk, F. Dignum, J.-J.C. Meyer, A programming language for cognitive agents: goal directed 3APL, in: M. Dastani, J. Dix,
A.E. Fallah-Seghrouchni (Eds.), Programming Multi-Agent Systems, First International Workshop, ProMAS 2003, Melbourne, Australia, July 15, 2003,
Selected Revised and Invited papers, in: LNCS, vol. 3067, Springer, 2004, pp. 111–130. doi:http://www.springerlink.com/content/l7dqkvqh5u941l4b.
6134 N. Alechina et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 412 (2011) 6115–6134
[2] M. Dastani, M.B. van Riemsdijk, J.-J.C. Meyer, Programming multi-agent systems in 3APL, in: R.H. Bordini, M. Dastani, J. Dix, A.E. Fallah-Seghrouchni
(Eds.), Multi-Agent Programming: Languages, Platforms and Applications, in: Multiagent Systems, Artificial Societies, and Simulated Organizations,
vol. 15, Springer, 2005, pp. 39–67.
[3] M. Dastani, 2APL: a practical agent programming language, Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 16 (3) (2008) 214–248.
[4] M. Dastani, J.-J.C. Meyer, A practical agent programming language, in: M. Dastani, A.E. Fallah-Seghrouchni, A. Ricci, M. Winikoff (Eds.), Proceedings of
the Fifth International Workshop on Programming Multi-agent Systems, ProMAS’07, in: LNCS, vol. 4908, Springer, 2008, pp. 107–123.
[5] R.H. Bordini, J.F. Hübner, R. Vieira, Jason and the Golden Fleece of agent-oriented programming, in: R.H. Bordini, M. Dastani, J. Dix, A. El Fallah
Seghrouchni (Eds.), Multi-Agent Programming: Languages, Platforms and Applications, Springer-Verlag, 2005, pp. 3–37.
[6] R.H. Bordini, J.F. Hübner, M. Wooldridge, Programming Multi-agent Systems in AgentSpeak Using Jason, Wiley, 2007.
[7] P. Busetta, R. Rönnquist, A. Hodgson, A. Lucas, JACK intelligent agents — components for intelligent agents in Java, AgentLink Newsletter (2) (1992)
2–5.
[8] D. Morley, K. Myers, The SPARK agent framework, in: Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent
Systems, AAMAS’04, IEEE Computer Society, Washington, DC, USA, 2004, pp. 714–721. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/AAMAS.2004.267.
[9] J. Thangarajah, J. Harland, D. Morley, N. Yorke-Smith, Aborting tasks in BDI agents, in: Proceedings of the Sixth International Joint Conference on
Autonomous Agents and Multi Agent Systems, AAMAS’07, Honolulu, HI, 2007, pp. 8–15.
[10] J. Thangarajah, J. Harland, D. Morley, N. Yorke-Smith, Suspending and resuming tasks in BDI agents, in: Proceedings of the Seventh International
Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi Agent Systems, AAMAS’08, Estoril, Portugal, 2008, pp. 405–412.
[11] N. Alechina, M. Dastani, B. Logan, J.-J.C. Meyer, A logic of agent programs, in: Proceedings of the Twenty-Second AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence, AAAI 2007, AAAI Press, 2007, pp. 795–800.
[12] N. Alechina, M. Dastani, B. Logan, J.-J.C. Meyer, Reasoning about agent deliberation, in: G. Brewka, J. Lang (Eds.), Proceedings of the Eleventh
International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning, KR’08, AAAI, Sydney, Australia, 2008, pp. 16–26.
[13] D. Harel, D. Kozen, J. Tiuryn, Dynamic Logic, MIT Press, 2000.
[14] A.S. Rao, AgentSpeak(L): BDI agents speak out in a logical computable language, in: Proceedings of Modelling Autonomous Agents in a Multi-Agent
World, in: LNAI, vol. 1038, Springer Verlag, 1996, pp. 42–55.
[15] S. Sardiña, L. Padgham, Goals in the context of BDI plan failure and planning, in: E.H. Durfee, M. Yokoo, M.N. Huhns, O. Shehory (Eds.), Proceedings of
the Sixth International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS 2007, ACM, 2007, pp. 1–8.
[16] G. Plotkin, A structural approach to operational semantics, Technical Report DAIMI-FN-19, Computer Science Department, Aarhus University,
Denmark, 1981.
[17] P. Blackburn, M. de Rijke, Y. Venema, Modal Logic, in: Cambridge Tracts in Theoretical Computer Science, vol 53, Cambridge University Press, 2001.
[18] M.J. Fischer, R.E. Ladner, Propositional dynamic logic of regular programs, Journal of Computer and System Sciences 18 (2) (1979) 194–211.
[19] U. Hustadt, R.A. Schmidt, MSPASS: modal reasoning by translation and first-order resolution, in: Proc. TABLEAUX 2000, in: LNCS, vol. 1847, Springer,
2000, pp. 67–71.
[20] R.A. Schmidt, pdl-tableau, http://www.cs.man.ac.uk/~schmidt/pdl-tableau, 2003.
[21] H.J. Levesque, R. Reiter, Y. Lespérance, F. Lin, R.B. Scherl, GOLOG: a logic programming language for dynamic domains, Journal of Logic Programming
31 (1–3) (1997) 59–83.
[22] J. Claßen, G. Lakemeyer, A logic for non-terminating Golog programs, in: G. Brewka, J. Lang (Eds.), Proceedings of the Eleventh International Conference
on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning, KR’08, AAAI, Sydney, Australia, 2008, pp. 589–599.
[23] B. van Riemsdijk, W. van der Hoek, J.-J.C. Meyer, Agent programming in Dribble: from beliefs to goals using plans, in: Proceedings of the Second
International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, AAMAS’03, ACM Press, New York, NY, USA, 2003, pp. 393–400.
doi:http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/860575.860639.
[24] D.T. Trang, B. Logan, N. Alechina, Verifying Dribble agents, in: M. Baldoni, J. Bentahar, J. Lloyd, M.B. van Riemsdijk (Eds.), Seventh International
Workshop on Declarative Agent Languages and Technologies, DALT 2009, Workshop Notes, Budapest Hungary, 2009, pp. 162–177.
